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Abstract 
This paper explores the implication of a neighborhood model for interfirm 
interactions that explicitly tries to create an equality matching relationship among firms in an 
industry. The aim is to examine what would happen if these firms worked to gain trust with 
each other with an eye toward maximizing the value of the collaboration across projects 
rather than just maximizing revenues in individual projects.  A review of extant literature and 
an analysis of in-depth interviews yielded three actionable strategies that support the creation 
of a sustainable neighborhood in the construction industry:  1) Hub Strategy, 2) Trust 
Exercise Strategy, and 3) Sustainable Neighborhood Strategy.  As envisioned in this study, 
the hub is a concentrated, inter-organizational structure for supply chain participants in large, 
complex projects.  Importantly, hub members engage in a variety of technical activities that 
infuse ongoing and future projects with innovation, scope optimization, and operational 
efficiencies.  Additionally, other activities within the hub are designed to purposefully allow 
participants to develop trust through collaboration before or outside of their primary 
contractual engagements.  At present, this model has been examined for construction 
megaprojects, but the general neighborhood concept could be applied to many different 
industries and settings including manufacturing supply chains and collaborations among 
communities engaging in economic development. Future work will explore whether 
mechanisms like the hub and trust exercises can be applied in these other settings as well. 
Key words: Supply chains, trust, collaboration, construction, strategy, long-term decision 
making 
Introduction 
Few businesses in any industry provide end-to-end service without requiring 
additional suppliers or subcontractors to complete the work. This observation is particularly 
true in large-scale construction projects where hundreds of firms may be involved in design, 
labor, and supplies. The involvement of a network of suppliers and contractors allows firms 
to specialize in a particular manufacturing technique, lead a particular contractual role or 
provide a unique labor force. Project owners can play the role of a conductor, bringing 
together firms on an ad hoc basis tailored to the specific needs of the project. 





However, this structure has disadvantages. In large projects, firms can spend 
considerable time, effort, and resources just to reach agreement with all of the subcontractors 
and suppliers. Firms participating in a project are often motivated to maximize their profit for 
each and every project and to minimize their risk exposure. Consequently, studies estimate 
that more than half of expenses in large construction projects are spent on coordination 
among firms rather than on the final product itself (Sarhan, Pasquire, & King, 2017).  
Large-scale construction projects have been studied extensively and although 
successful collaborations have been documented, failure is common (Bresnen & Marshall 
2000a, b; Larson & Drexler, 1997). A significant source of failure is the “lowest-bid-wins” 
approach that creates different incentives for prime contractors and subcontractors, leading 
them to compete rather than collaborate, which can reduce trust and ultimately performance 
(Kadefors, 2004). Trust is a key component in successful ventures and is influenced by both 
organizational and contractual aspects of a construction project (Zaghloul & Hartman, 2003). 
When firms work together often, though, they are able to develop some familiarity in 
the way they operate. Wong, Cheung, and Ho (2005) find that for construction developer 
clients and contractors in Hong Kong, the cycle of building a trusted relationship between 
partners is predicted by a contractor’s reliable, competent performance and transparent 
communication with the client, and the client’s reciprocating trust in the contractor. This trust 
can in turn reduce some of the friction that is responsible for the high administrative costs of 
projects. In this paper, we explore a few approaches to reducing the conflict among firms in 
large projects. Then, we propose a neighborhood model that explores methods for getting 
firms that have developed trusted relationships to move beyond a focus on single projects to 
maximizing the value they can provide each other over time. We suggest that this model also 
has benefits in enabling firms to reduce inefficiencies in project designs. Finally, we suggest 
methods for codifying this structure.   
 
The neighborhood metaphor 
Research by Alan Fiske (1991) identified four types of relationships among people 
that characterize the ways that people engage with each other. Three of them are particularly 
relevant here. The first—market pricing—is a low-trust relationship in which people settle up 
transactions in the moment. This is the kind of relationship most common among strangers as 
well as individuals who do not trust each other. The second—equality matching—involves 
higher levels of trust and engagement in which people expect to give and get things of 
equivalent value over time, though particular transactions may be weighted more heavily in 
favor of one party or the other. This relationship is common among neighbors and colleagues. 
Finally, there is the communal sharing relationship which involves high levels of trust and 
engagement and in which people do not try to settle up their debts. This relationship is typical 
of families who take care of other family members without requiring a specific balancing 
payment in return. 
Much of the basis of modern organizational structure is rooted in the assumption that 
actors in organizations are operating in their enlightened self-interest at any given time. 
Without making this point explicitly, these models assume a market pricing relationship 
among individuals in which individuals are responding to the reward structure in the 
environment at that moment rather than taking the longer time-horizon that an equality 
matching neighborhood structure might support. Likewise, the focus on interfirm interactions 
tends to be on individual projects rather than on determining the value of the interfirm 
relationship over time and taking actions to maximize that long-term value. This tendency has 
been exacerbated by the dictum that publicly traded companies maximize shareholder value, 
which is strongly influenced by short-term quarterly performance (Rapoport, 1986). 





In this paper, we explore the implication of a neighborhood model for interfirm 
interactions that explicitly tries to create an equality matching relationship among firms in an 
industry. The aim is to examine what would happen if these firms worked to gain trust with 
each other with an eye toward maximizing the value of the collaboration across projects 
rather than just maximizing revenues in individual projects.  
To date, most of our research has focused on firms involved in large-scale 
construction projects, and so we will draw examples from that industry throughout this paper, 
though other industries with significant supply-chain relationships may benefit from the same 
approach. The neighborhood provides a structure for organizations to come together in a 
cooperative network that promotes trust and collaboration, and that spans formal contractual 
engagements for individual projects. Firms should seek to cultivate sustainable relationships 
with partners and suppliers that enable them to minimize the effort required to negotiate new 
agreements as new projects arise. They should also seek to communicate the value of these 
relationships when bidding on contracts in order to help potential clients to recognize the 
long-term cost savings that emerge from healthy functioning business neighborhoods. We 
find that the neighborhood model offers a structure for long-term, mutually beneficial 
relationships among a collective of firms that could potentially persist over several 
contractually defined projects. 
The construction industry has recognized that a collaborative environment would 
likely ease problems that arise during particular projects as well as accelerate the process of 
reaching agreements in new projects. In the next section, we review five models that have 
been proposed to address these issues: Integrated Project Delivery (IPD), Aligned 
Construction Enterprise (ACE), Systems Integrator, and Service-Dominated Logic (S-DL), 
which informed our analysis and shaped our findings. In addition, we briefly review the 
innovation reef model, which was developed after analyses of successful startup incubators. 
On the basis of this review and our own explorations, we argue that three neighborhood 
creation strategies: hub, trust exercise, and sustainable neighborhood, appear likely to 
produce trust-building collaboration.  
 
Five models of interfirm collaboration 
The most common methods for awarding large-scale construction projects are Design 
Build and Design Bid Build structures (as shown in Figure 1, Panel a). Design, Bid, Build 
(DBB) projects are most restrictive for general contractors, because architecture and 
engineering for the projects have already been completed prior to bidding the job, and so the 
owner seeks a general contractor and subcontractors who will follow specifications that have 
already been set. Design Build (DB) projects are somewhat less restrictive, because the 
general contractor and subcontractors have more opportunity to work with the project owner 
to influence the implementation of the project.  
Two problems with these models have been the target of new approaches to 
contracting. First, there is little opportunity (in the case of DBB projects) or incentive (in the 
case of DB projects) in these projects for the general contractor and subcontractors to make 
recommendations in the design process that will minimize the cost or time to completion of 
the project. In addition, neither of these structures promotes teamwork among the 
participating firms. 
1. Integrated Project Delivery 
Integrated project delivery (IPD) is a model in construction project administration 
where the project owner works with contractors on a project team to define and manage the 
project before construction begins (see Figure 1, Panel a).  Agreed-upon project goals and 
responsibilities, shared financial incentives, and continuous and transparent communication 
among partners in the project team led to IPD success (Xie & Liu, 2017).   





IPD provides an innovative mechanism to promote engagement and cooperation 
among participating firms: the multiparty contract that is established before the design stage.  
A key element of this framework is that all participants fund a shared risk management bond 
that is used to cover the expenses of project disruptions.  At the end of the project, funds 
remaining in the shared bond are returned to participants in proportion to their initial 
contribution.  This multiparty framework facilitates co-creation of common approaches to 
relationships and contracts between firms early on in the project and establishes a shared 
precedent for ongoing communication and problem-solving, in response to unexpected 
project disruptions.  
In a review of a large sample (n=113) of capital projects, Suprapto, Bakker, Mooi, 
and Hertogh (2016), found that partnering projects that included behavioral incentives were 
found to have improved relational attitudes and teamworking qualities compared to lump sum 
or reimbursable projects.  However, the actual role of incentives on those outcomes was less 
clear. While incentives to motivate behavior change in a project may contribute to improved 
relationships between firms, this consequence may be more incidental than intentional. IPD 
advocates argue that intentionally improving relational attitudes and teamworking quality 
among project participants improves project performance. 
IPD is based on collaborative involvement with key participants early in a project and 
has been shown to outperform “bid and build” (DB) and “design, bid, and build” (DBB) 
project management systems (El Asmar, Hanna, & Loh, 2013). In a “bid and build,” the 
customer specifies the work to be done.  In a “design and build,” the customer communicates 
the end requirements, and the contractor develops and executes the solution to fit the 
requirements.  As shown in Figure 1, IPD brings participants together, without the hierarchy 
of traditional approaches.   
2. Aligned Construction Enterprise  
The Aligned Construction Enterprise (ACE), proposed by Jergeas and Lynch (2014), 
is a collaborative project delivery model designed to address the structural and organizational 
deficiencies often seen in the delivery of megaprojects. Similar to IPD, ACE brings 
participants together early in a project and additionally focuses on a value network with 
participation by all relevant parties.  Figure 1, panel b illustrates a crucial systems integrator 
function at the center of the value network.  A key element of the Systems Integrator is joint 
ownership and control by all project participants. The systems integrator center is envisioned 
to contain expertise on a variety of skills, including lean IPD.  An important philosophical 
contribution of ACE is the shift from thinking about supply chains, with owner at the top, to 
value networks based on common values, organizing principles, best practices, risk 
management, and project schedule. 
3. Collaborative Contracting 
Johansen, Olsson, George, and Asbjørn, R. (2019) expand the systems integrator 
concept by building on ACE.  Now more than a function, the systems integrator is more 
formally defined as an intermediary that can be an independent person or firm with a sound 
understanding of major-project complexities that sits between the owner and suppliers and 
encourages collaboration.  More than a project manager, the systems integrator sets common 
project goals and maintains the focus on long-term collaboration among owners and 
suppliers.  Figure 1, Panel c, taken from Johansen et al. (2019), depicts contractual 
governance from the systems integrator and alliance partners with the double-ended arrows 
and strategic alliance agreement structures with dotted circle.  
 





Figure 1.  Project Management Strategies 
 
Caption:  Panels a, b, and c depict the evolution of project management strategies from the hierarchical (bid 
build (DB) and design bid build (DBB) toward more cooperative strategies.  Integrated Project Delivery (IPD), 
Aligned Construction Enterprise (ACE), and Collaborative Construction use circular orientations among 
participants to emphasize horizontal power relationships instead of hierarchical power relationships. 
 
4. Service-Dominated Logic 
Networks with collaboration centers innovate how projects are managed. Xu, 2020, 
addresses operational models that look at resources and enterprise value prioritizing service-
dominated logic (S-DL) instead of individual transactions (Lusch & Vargo, 2014).  S-DL is 
an example of how the organization of ACE could be centered on a value of service instead 
of a value of minimizing individual firm risk and maximizing individual firm profit. In S-DL, 
value is co-created through the social capital of relationships and reciprocal transactions.  
Trust is an emergent process that can be fostered through activities, including learning, 
relating, controlling, collaborating, and routinising (Munro & Childerhouse, 2018).  Trust is 
enhanced through self-reinforcing cycles, as shown in Figure 2.  Xu frames S-DL as a model 
that “shifts the focus away from projects, goods, and services toward service ecosystems.”  
Within this ecosystem, construction participants co-create value with owners and even users 
of the built environment that is produced by the completed project.  Xu focuses on trust 
within individual projects, but trust within an ecosystem is a concept that has the potential to 
influence longer-term inter-organizational relationships. 
 





Figure 2.  Trust Generating Process 
Source:  Xu (2020) 
 
5. Neighborhood 
Drawing from the literature reviewed, we adapt the neighborhood to the field of 
supply chain and multi-institutional construction projects. The systems integrator approach 
suggested a key role for a stakeholder playing the role of a “hub” in a neighborhood. As we 
envision it, the hub is a concentrated, inter-organizational structure for supply chain 
participants in large, complex projects.  Importantly, hub members engage in a variety of 
technical activities that infuse ongoing and future projects with innovation, scope 
optimization, and operational efficiencies.  Additionally, other activities within the hub are 
designed to purposefully allow participants to develop trust through collaboration before or 
outside of their primary contractual engagements.  Pre-project value engineering and 
feasibility studies are complemented by, for example, disaster preparedness activities where 
participating organizations work through real-world project scenarios, like supply disruptions 
or natural disasters, before they occur in contracted engagements.   
In addition, to think about implementing a neighborhood, we also draw from the 
innovation reef metaphor that emerged from studies of successful business incubators such as 
the Austin Technology Incubator (Markman, 2012; Pogue et al., 2016). An institution like an 
incubator provides a structure to bring the right people together in an innovation network that 
promotes the diffusion of ideas and practices to the marketplace through entrepreneurial 
activity. While the structure of the innovation reef primarily gathers people to innovate and 
advise, the structure of the neighborhood promotes cooperation. These two models are related 
in that the envisioned neighborhood, like the reef, supports innovation beyond the 
aforementioned reduction of waste and excess cost.  By supporting a long-term view of 
collaboration, participants trust their neighborhood partners to innovate by optimizing 
partners’ scope for collective benefits, rather than simply looking at short-term gains for their 
individual firm.  
Figure 3, panel a, illustrates some of the structural attributes of the neighborhood.  
Participants in a neighborhood may participate in another neighborhood, at times with a 
different role.  For example, a subcontractor in one neighborhood might be a general 
contractor (GC) in another.  Some neighborhoods might be viewed as parallel neighborhoods; 
others might be more accurately thought of as sub-neighborhoods.   





As illustrated in Figure 3, panel b, neighborhoods are formed outside of the confines 
of an existing project for the explicit goal of sustaining themselves over time across multiple 
projects.  As dynamic ecosystems, neighborhoods also evolve over time, with new 
participants joining and, perhaps, established participants exiting. These exits might reflect 
neighborhood members who find other firms with whom to work, but maintaining an equality 
matching relationship within the neighborhood also requires that firms that do not provide 
positive value to the neighborhood over the long-term be removed from it. In the absence of 
strategies for removing participants who do not add value, neighborhoods run the risk of 
promoting “free riders” who take advantage of their status without contributing to the long-
term success and efficiency of the cohort. Finally, the roles played by a participant may 
change over time. 
Despite the alignment reviewed in Integrated Project Delivery (IPD), Aligned 
Construction Enterprise (ACE), Systems Integrator, and Service-Dominated Logic (S-DL), 
the construction industry seems fixated on the individual project as the transactional unit for 
relationship management between firms. From our interviews, we find that the normative, 
albeit disappearing, practice among project managers, firm executives, and corporate leaders 
follows structuring supply chains with contracts that reallocate risk to maximize the return 
from a particular project or the next quarter’s results. Just as neighbors invest in homes with 
30-year mortgages and infrastructure like roads, parks, and schools, so too should industries 
invest in trusted supply chains that both incentivize long-term relationships in a portfolio of 
capital projects and encourage market entry for new firms to spur innovation. 
 













Solving new problems successfully requires generating a variety of unique problem 
statements (Markman, 2017). Our aim with these interviews was to characterize the current 
state of collaboration on significant projects to better understand the gap that must be bridged 
by a collaborative approach.  Our analysis also benefitted from the iterative review of our 
research question and interview guide.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 industry participants from firms 
involved at various levels of the construction supply chain.  Four interviewees were from 
multinational corporations. Three of the corporations were leaders in the oil and gas industry. 
Interviews from the multinational corporations provided insights from the perspective of a 
project owner, although some interviewees also had pervious employment at firms in the 
supply chain.  The remaining interviews were with firms who at times were the lead 
contractor or a subcontractor.  Interviews followed a flexible discussion guide that allowed 
for probing and follow-up to newly revealed ideas.  All interviews lasted about an hour and 





involved multiple members of the research team.  All interviews involved a primary 
participant, although some interviews included multiple participants. Interviewees shared 
their perspectives anonymously, and thus all identifying information has been removed from 
the same firm.    
 
Results 
Our interview participants described using practices related to the concepts embedded 
in the five models of interfirm collaboration summarized earlier. For the firms that we 
interviewed, four primary issues emerged from our analysis: 1. The same people working 
together, 2. The scale and length of time that people will work together, 3. The process for 
regular communication, problem-solving, and innovation, and 4. The sharing of risk and 
reward. We refer to the firms we interviewed using the letters A, B, E, S, and W.    
1. The same people working together 
E, a leading oil and gas company with a global scope, has used strategic alliances as a 
purchasing mechanism to reduce friction and improve project execution with its suppliers. 
Although E did mention that relationships established with subcontractors during cooperative 
bidding processes did pay off, as a procurement process, the focus was more on qualifying 
vendors and setting pricing structure than establishing cooperative behaviors from which trust 
might emerge.  As a consequence, the alliance program was ultimately discontinued. 
S, a third global oil and gas company, has long recognized that coherent teams of 
suppliers bring a multitude of benefits to a series of projects, but has also recognized that 
those benefits are largely driven by two primary factors: continuity of the people involved 
and of the type of work being performed from project to project. From S’s perspective, a shift 
in personnel is only one of many possible disruptions to an interorganizational cooperation. 
However, as researchers, we believe that retaining the same personnel could improve 
responses to other disruptions over time.  
W, a road and waterworks construction contractor in a large Southwestern U.S. state, 
is an example of an organization that organically evolved in the direction of the neighborhood 
model through an evolutionary process, as they navigated the competitive contractual 
processes of winning business from governmental agencies and municipalities. W employed 
an agency whose role was to act as a hub for W’s contractors. However, W’s supplier noted 
that they experienced inefficiencies in working with W when their contact at the hub agency 
changed.  
2. The scale and length of time that people will work together 
In line with concerns about personnel turnover, S also believed that maintaining a 
climate of cooperation is easier for smaller projects. They believed that improvements to 
efficiency disappear when key personnel are not retained and when project parameters, like 
geography, governance systems, enabling technology, and economic climate, shift. These 
parameters seemed more likely to shift in the context of large-scale projects.   
B, a leading mineral extraction company also with a global scope and significant 
operation in oil and gas, recognizes the need for certain aspects of its business to be sustained 
across projects. B typically breaks mega projects into subprojects that occur in stages; mega 
projects can last for several years.  These large projects involve a selection phase that often 
runs for 18 to 24 months wherein three contractors will work with B in parallel (and in 
competition) to optimize the approach used for the project. B uses an organizational structure, 
where services needed in all projects, like purchasing and legal, are shared across projects. 
Even so, interactions with suppliers still occur within the context of an individual project, 
instead of interacting with suppliers in the context of multiple projects.   
3. The process for regular communication, problem-solving, and innovation 





For B’s mega projects, optimization involves trade-offs among 5 – 10 objectives. This 
process allows the owner to test the competing contractors’ capabilities, experience, and 
innovation.  As the selection phase proceeds, the number of participating contractors is 
trimmed to one who will execute the project in the field. In addition to technical assessment, 
this selection process allows the owner to gain familiarity with the contractors’ business 
philosophy and mindset, allowing the selection process to be informed by perceptions of 
common goals and commitment to meeting the needs of the project. B used a series of 
interorganizational meetings comprised of participants from their project team and key 
suppliers to work through issues that arise during project execution. 
In response to the description of the hub strategy, one participant from B recalled 
success at a prior firm working with a consultant that set up a hub-like model for a previous 
project where some of the benefits of our neighborhood hub were actually realized. In that 
instance, a consultant was hired, during an early phase of a mega project that had suffered 
schedule delays, to work with the project owner and the selected contractors and suppliers to 
create a formal business entity to which employees from all participating firms were 
assigned.  The process took several weeks to implement, but it broke the adversarial mindset 
so common in mega projects and the project was then able to respond more quickly and 
efficiently to existing and subsequent disruptions.  One year later, the project’s schedule was 
within 10% of the original plan.  Based on that previous success, B wondered if the 
neighborhood model might be piloted in a specific project, a current but early-stage offshore 
megaproject. 
A is an organization that likewise evolved its own operating philosophy along the 
same lines as the neighborhood concept. As a builder of buildings, A operates at different 
levels within the construction supply chain, depending on the project.  When the scope of a 
project is the construction of a building, A is the prime contractor interacting with the owner.  
When they build a component of a larger project, e.g., an oil and gas refinery, A is a supplier 
to the engineering, construction, and procurement (EPC) firm that was hired by the oil and 
gas owner to execute the larger scope of work.   
A was also in a unique position to understand the point of view of owners and 
suppliers because A had established relationships of trust as a supplier with several owners, 
allowing them to innovate in multiple projects for the owner. In addition, A has its own 
supply chains for larger jobs and has implemented the same sort of trust and collaboration 
relationship with its suppliers. Among large corporations, owners may be competing with 
each other to maximize short-term profit for the individual corporation, instead of investing 
in its supply chain, by taking on shared risk in large projects.  
Much of W’s work falls contractually into what is referred to as “bid and build,” but 
some of their work falls into the DB model. These two project archetypes illustrate different 
neighborhood potential, with DB affording the firm a much more participatory interaction 
with its customer, one that is more aligned with the collaborative ideas of the neighborhood.  
4. The sharing of risk and reward 
Earlier we described how, as a procurement process, E used strategic alliances as a 
purchasing mechanism to reduce friction and expedite project execution.  The focus was 
more on qualifying vendors and setting pricing structure than establishing cooperative 
behaviors from which trust might emerge.  Additionally, that process was also intended to 
reduce risk on future projects because contracts were focused on pre-qualified suppliers. 
“Bid and build” projects afford far fewer opportunities for cooperative neighborhood 
behaviors to emerge, due to the tight budget and financial controls within the contracts for 
such projects; parties will usually stop work when a project disruption occurs so that they can 
assess the impact and level of responsibility for each firm. These kinds of delays increase 
costs but could ideally have reduced impact in a neighborhood where trusted relationships 





have already been built and structures for shared financial risks and rewards have been 
established before project execution. For example, in a bid and build project, a contractor for 
W described how its client quickly shouldered additional costs when its design was faulty, 
instead of delaying the project to negotiate additional costs with W and its contractor; W’s 
trusted relationship with its client and contractor led to a quicker return to fixing the problem.  
For B’s mega projects, planning includes extensive risk analysis and assignment of 
risk, through stage-gate decision making. Early involvement in this process allows the owner 
and contractors to develop a sense of common and committed purpose.  However, one of the 
drawbacks of this transactional approach is that contractors who are involved early in a 
project, including scope optimization and value engineering, often tend to be more 
conservative about the scope and submit a higher budget when competing for the larger, 
later-stage execution contract.  Other contractors, with less or no experience during the 
competitive selection phase, can be more aggressive in their budget assumptions, appearing 
to be more price competitive than the firms who have worked with the owner to optimize the 
project approach.  This myopic shift invariably leads to the selected contractor abusing the 
change order process to increase their budget as the project proceeds.  In a neighborhood, 
participants would be motivated to collaborate earlier and resolve scope issues with less 
impact on the overall project. 
 
Discussion 
Our interviews confirm that all participants in the present study have experienced trust 
as an emergent process that takes far more time to develop than it takes to destroy or 
diminish. Participants also perceive that current transactional processes associated with large 
capital projects are untenable because of built-in inefficiency and myopia. Owners, who 
currently control much of the structure and form of the common interactions with suppliers, 
recognize the potential benefits of the neighborhood concept, but appear less willing or able 
to engage in formative activities to test and develop a pilot hub.  In contrast, suppliers, appear 
more willing and able to engage in the process.  Our interviews reveal a common perception 
that the industry, in the pursuit of short-term profit and efficiency, has developed a mindset 
that needs to be disrupted in order to survive in post-fossil-fuel-dominated markets. 
Suppliers who serve owner organizations are themselves the customers of their 
suppliers.  This research suggests that an initial neighborhood hub might be formed in the 
supply chain at least two levels from mega project owners.  Such owners are enslaved by 
their own simple, bottom-line metrics (ROI, NPV, etc.) and culture.  They see the need to 
change, but they are stuck.  But they control how opportunities are created and presented to 
contractors (DB, DBB, EPC, etc.).  Thus, testing the neighborhood at a set of nodes in the 
construction ecosystem where the lead owner has also experienced the negatives of being in a 
contractor role will increase the likelihood that all parties will engage in the creation process.  
Larger firms like E, B, and S appear to function only as owners, and while they recognize the 
merit of the neighborhood, they appear to have less ability to engage in a trial of the 
neighborhood than smaller firms like W and A who, at different times on different projects, 
function as an owner, a general contractor, or a subcontractor. 
One of the benefits to a supplier of being a member of a neighborhood is that having 
won the trust of an owner, firms are now in an incumbent position for future projects.  That 
trust is typically developed over a series of projects. This track record can lead owners to 
think of particular suppliers as partners rather than as one of an interchangeable set of firms 
that might participate in a project. This trusted-neighbor status allows (and creates an 
incentive for) suppliers to engage in projects more deeply while simultaneously requiring less 
strict oversight from the owner.  In practice, however even after having earned that status, 
such suppliers are at times unable to retain their level of performance.  Because future work 





is still speculative, they seek contacts with other owners to grow their business, motivating 
the first owner to solicit proposals from multiple core suppliers.  The proposed neighborhood 
envisions engagement among neighborhood participants that facilitate sustainable 
relationships that bridge inevitable gaps between individual projects.  
As always, caution about unintended consequences is warranted.  One set of issues 
that can lead to potentially unintended consequences is the establishment and communication 
of the neighborhood’s goals. For example, it is hard to predict how neighborhoods will 
efficiently engage new firms in potential and established business partnerships. On one hand, 
the informality of a neighborhood may promote permeability over more typical, formal multi-
corporation relationships. Neighborhoods may offer an ease of introduction and engagement 
with new firms through ongoing, but tangentially related, projects. However, such 
engagement of new firms is suspected to require active knowledge, collaboration, and 
interface with members of the neighborhood. This could be problematic when minority-
owned businesses are relatively under-represented in particular industry clusters.   
Further, the influence of established trust networks could strengthen existing 
relationships and reduce permeability of new firms into the neighborhood. For example, one 
strategy that minority-owned businesses have employed is to support each other and target 
customers with similar identities, as a way to counteract their exclusion in formal and 
informal ways from the dominant business culture and climate. This homophily strategy has 
proven to be a powerful way to breed trust, enhance satisfaction, and develop a stable 
cooperative neighborhood.  And, such a specialized neighborhood may perfectly serve the 
needs and aspirations of its members, but such business enclaving has also been shown to 
limit growth. More broadly, neighborhoods should consider strategies facilitating broader 
interactions with new firms, innovative approaches to identify and vet new candidates who 
could offer improved performance, and setting inclusion criteria or operational constraints 
that enhance alignment and common purpose in the short term, but do so in a way that limits 
growth of the neighborhood.   
In the next section, we explore a few structures and strategies that might be useful for 
developing and supporting inter-firm collaboration. 
 
Strategies for neighborhood development 
A review of extant literature and an analysis of interviews summarized here yield 
three actionable strategies that support the creation of a sustainable neighborhood in the 
construction industry.   
1. Hub Strategy:  Interorganizational Collaboration through an Intermediary, Alliance, 
or Consortium.   
The hub is a (relatively) small interorganizational business unit whose 
stakeholders/participants include dedicated staff from project owners, prime contractors, key 
subcontractors, and critical suppliers.  This small interdisciplinary and interorganizational 
team is the nexus for cooperative behaviors and a concentrator for the development of those 
behaviors.  This concept is envisioned to have flexible instances optimized for the industry 
and supply chain focus.  Like the innovation reef, the hub is a structure that convenes the 
appropriate participants, now fit for service as a concentrator for emergent behaviors.  As 
discussed above, versions of this concept are well supported in prior project management 
research, e.g., IPD, ACE, and S-DL.  The neighborhood model with the hub as the focal point 
was tested in several interviews with uniformly favorable support for the idea.  
Our interviews reinforce several principles required for the hub to be viable. Trust 
emerges over time, organically based on shared experiences. Larger projects with diffuse 
scopes of work, many participants, and broad geographies create challenges to the 
development of trust.  A hub is an environment that can be fitted to the problem domain that 





convenes the needed parties around a common set of goals.  At the very least, the investment 
of resources in a hub acknowledges the expectation of inevitable issues and the expectation 
that all stakeholders are committed to cooperatively solving those issues as they arise. 
Critically, the hub envisioned here is not created just for the duration of a single project. A 
hub that is sustained for more than a single project would facilitate workflow, reduce project 
costs, and increase profit, due to the accrual of shared problem-solving in previous projects.  
For example, within the neighborhood, the circles in Figure 3 above represent a 
different kind of governance, perhaps in the form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
that complements the neighborhood charter or set of bylaws represented by the dotted circle 
for the alliance partnership.  As members of the neighborhood, who are participants in the 
hub initiate individual projects, the established and trusted neighborhood structures are 
carried over to inform specific contractual clauses, allowing the neighborhood to set the 
covenant that is implemented in the contractual terms.  As depicted in Figure 4, participating 
organizations with assigned or dedicated employees to the hub, bring representation from all 
organizations the circle of the neighborhood into the hub, the neighborhood center. 
 
Figure 4.  The neighborhood hub 
 
 
2. Trust Exercise Strategy.   
Clearly, trust can be built up over time among firms that work together on projects. 
However, this trust may also be accelerated through exercises that enable key firm 
stakeholders to work together and get a feel for how other stakeholders think and act. This 
can be done through a series of trust exercises. 
The trust exercise strategy involves problem solving in response to real-world “what 
if” scenarios, over a series of meetings in parallel with the “get to know you” scoping and 
contracting activities during the pre-contract stage of large projects. Wong, Cheung, Yiu, and 
Pang (2008), note that trust plays, at best, a small role in construction contracting in spite of 
the apparent advantage it could offer in a field where “collaboration among contracting 
parties is essential in order to accomplish sophisticated tasks that require multi-parties’ 
involvement.” (Wong et al., 2008, p. 828). The power dynamics and confrontational style of 
contract negotiation and enforcement appear to overwhelm the potential advantage of 
collaboration and create the common dominant relational environment. The authors further 
tested the contributions of three types of trust: system-based, cognition-based and affect-
based expressions. They found that all elements contributed equally when trust building 





occurs arguing that knowledge and understanding in relationship, feelings and emotions 
experience, as well as performance and faith in an overarching system are critical to trust in 
this industry. 
The development of trusted relationships has been explored in commercial settings. 
Laeequddin et al. (2012) reviewed various trust-building concepts and five trust models to 
develop an integrated conceptual model for building trust in supply chains.  Diverging from 
other scholars, they conclude that “supply chain members should strive to reduce the risk 
levels to build trust rather than striving to build trust to reduce the risk” (Laeequddin et al., 
2012, p. 550). They further assert that, rather than being an emergent process, trust-building 
can be achieved instantly if risks can be evaluated.  Part of this assessment process is to 
ensure that appropriate control mechanisms are put in place, including legal frameworks, 
contacts, agreements, and insurance. 
Figure 5, adapted from Johansen et al. (2019), illustrates a typical project 
management workflow for dealing with unplanned events.  The traditional process involves a 
sequence of steps to characterize the disruption, analyze the uncertainty introduced into the 
project, assess the impact, and apportion the response into whether it offers an advantageous 
opportunity or simply adds risk that needs to be mitigated.  Simulated events and activities 
logically include both those that are controllable and commonly part of planning activities as 
well as non-controllable factors that often disrupt projects.    
We suggest that this same process be incorporated into planned activities as part of 
the trust exercise outside of a formal project.  There are some parallels with disaster 
preparedness training exercises, in which teams with distinct roles go through controlled and 
realistic rehearsals for rapid response to a disaster (Legatt & Clark, 2011). There are also 
parallels in the logic of public health prevention, like with vaccines, that prepare for plausible 
risk to the body instead of treatment and recovery after disruption to homeostasis.  
These kinds of preemptive activities might be done in a moderated workshop that 
would be augmented with discrete event or agent-based simulation components to allow the 
scenarios to mimic the randomness of real-world situations.  This “game” effect would allow 
for the consequences to be felt in a sped-up virtual reality. In addition to experience with the 
competence, creativity, and communication of partners, these kinds of trust-building 
exercises might allow contracts to have “collaborative mediation” clauses that guide 
cooperation between trusted partners. This would be more easily implemented through firms 
involved in a potential or active neighborhood relationship. By comparison, current 
approaches are often more focused on the assignment of responsibility and budget impact 
before beginning the development of a solution to the disruption.  Such assessments and 
assignments frequently result in a sequence of additional project disruptions as participants 
assess what is best for their firm rather than how to resolve the issue efficiently.  
Additionally, these trust-building exercises (while not focused on technological innovation) 
may serendipitously reveal opportunities to innovate with existing methods, processes, or 
tools across firm domains.  





Figure 5.  Example Template for Generating Disruptions to Stimulate Cooperation and Trust 
 
Source: adapted from Johansen et al., 2019, p.40 
 
3. Sustainable Neighborhood Strategy   
In order to promote a sustainable neighborhood, trust exercises can provide a 
groundwork for helping firms learn to collaborate and share risk, while a hub can coordinate 
activities across members of the neighborhood. These strategies are a good fit for 
construction megaprojects in oil and gas, because these projects are typically large, complex, 
and take place over several years going through a number of phases.  
Although neighborhoods may be formed in response to a specific project opportunity, 
neighborhood planning should explicitly recognize common sustainability goals and include 
a mechanism that incentivizes engagement outside the scope of contracted projects.  
Participants would ideally view themselves as partners and be motivated to contribute in the 
near term with an ability to trust that such contributions will pay off in the future. 
Our research to date suggests that novel measures of effectiveness may in fact be the 
critical set of criteria for the successful formation of neighborhood. As reviewed earlier, 
substantial thinking and professional practice has been and remains focused on the project, a 
perspective that at times has been extended to a series of similar projects or, among large 
projects, phases of similar effort executed sequentially. Owners and alliances of owners in 
joint ventures appear to drive much of this project-based orientation because they approach 
these interorganizational commitments from a capital investment framework that reduces 
measures of success to metrics like return on investment and net present value that reduce 
behavioral trajectories (viz., projects) to simple measures that can be easily compared.  
Alternatively, another approach is exemplified by significant research and practice that 
addresses the covenant that precedes or surrounds a contract.  As one example from 
interpersonal relationships within a social context, Strom and Faw (2017) develop a measure 
to assess the interaction, interdependence, and community aspects with faith-based systems 
that contrast with contractual elements in personal relationships that focus on the individual, 
personal needs, and clauses that provide for exiting relationships.  Our interviews reveal a 
prevalent expectation that business relationships have a finite lifespan, as expressed by one 





participant as “4, 5, or maybe 6 years.”  This practical limit can be addressed, in the mind of 
this participant, by including additional evaluative criteria that address valuing the 
consistency of the people involved from project to project and then addressing the technical 
and business scope of effort for a project. 
Rinkus, Dobson, Gore, & Dreelin (2016) provide an example of a partnership in 
watershed permit management to show how “intermediate measures of partnership 
effectiveness” can be used in a feedback loop to establish and sustain a neighborhood through 
changes in external industry context and internal turnover of stakeholders within the 
neighborhood. The authors identify the following five measures that we can conceptually 
apply to the neighborhood concept: perceived personal, organizational, and community 
benefits of participation in the neighborhood, shared ownership and commitment to the 
collaborative effort of the neighborhood, perceived effectiveness of the neighborhood’s 
ability to achieve its goals, perceived effectiveness of the neighborhood process, and future 
expectations of neighborhood effectiveness. The authors find that participants in the 
watershed partnership identified capacity building, networking, and increasing awareness 
across the watershed as the most positive outcomes from the partnership process. The authors 
also identify certain structural and functional aspects of the partnership process that were 
more important to its success, like having an outside facilitator and incorporating “learning 
sessions” where outside technical expertise was brought in to decrease the knowledge gap 
between participants. Note the similarity of this structured approach to the proposed trust-
building exercises. 
The trust generation process discussed by Xu (2020) in the context of S-DL provides 
a means for elevating the learning process of trust creation through cyclical engagement that 
expands collaboration to cocreation and reciprocal control with a social orientation.  
Emergent value is found in a transaction, granting unexpected forms, quantities and 
repeatability of value in addition to monetary transfer. Our research suggests that contractors 
and suppliers are ready for this shift, and that owners recognize the need.  The enduring 
challenge will be shifting the mindset of owners and their investors to a degree that behavior 
can also change. 
 
Future Research 
Within the construction industry, there is much work to be done to determine how to 
implement a neighborhood. The interviews conducted so far indicate an interest in this 
concept and a general willingness on the part of firms to engage with models that reduce 
friction among participants in large projects. The next steps in this work involve exploring 
the sentiment among a large range of firms around the neighborhood in comparison to the 
other collaborative agreement models reviewed earlier. In addition, the hub and trust exercise 
approaches will be piloted. 
This paper represents an initial attempt to develop a viable model of interfirm 
collaboration in large-scale industrial projects that persist across the span of several projects. 
At present, this model has been examined for construction megaprojects, but the general 
neighborhood concept could be applied to many different industries and settings including 
manufacturing supply chains and collaborations among communities engaging in economic 
development. Future work will explore whether mechanisms like the hub and trust exercises 
can be applied in these other settings as well. 
A significant challenge to be addressed in future research is that trusted collaboration 
involves decisions and interactions over time that are difficult to qualitatively or 
quantitatively.  Business planning is replete with net present value comparisons that equalize 
projects of various lengths and different risk profiles in a single (monetary) metric at a single 
(present) point in time.  The collaborative interactions envisioned for the neighborhood will 





require something akin to true age or true health (Shmueli, 2003).  For individuals, true health 
combines multiple heterogeneous measures of health and quality of life across age, gender, 
income, ethnicity, etc. in a common (unobserved) scale based on several different observable 
metrics.  Such a measure of neighborhood health would allow participants to assess the 
current state of their neighborhood and explore with other participants possible plans and 
interventions to manage the health trajectory of the neighborhood.  Like a care team in 
healthcare, participating firms in a neighborhood would contribute to a partnership. 
Finally, we pointed out several potential negative impacts of developing a 
neighborhood including the prospect for free riders, and the difficulty that new firms 
(particularly those that might be owned by under-represented groups) might have in gaining 
admission to the neighborhood. As this work moves forward, we are particularly interested in 
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